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Part I: 2020: 
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To thrive in 2020, we must conceive of the fi eld of 
public administration in the broadest possible terms. 
Phenomena that typically have been treated peripherally 
in our literature are emerging center stage in recent years, 
confi rming that the “old” boundaries of our discipline do 
not refl ect contemporary reality. After reviewing three key 
developments—the rise of mixed and nongovernmental 
institutions in public policy, the increasing importance 
of market mechanisms, and the assertion of meaningful 
global regulation—an argument is made for a broader 
reconception of “publicness” that goes hand in hand with 
the embrace of governance in lieu of administration.
The most formidable enclosures are those that go unrecognized, creating a confi nement so profound that those entrapped are unaware 
of the boundary. In the movie Th e Truman Show, Jim 
Carrey’s character is the subject of a “reality” television 
show, living his entire life within an elaborate sound-
stage. He exists in this state of ignorance, with his every 
move providing entertainment for the viewers at home, 
until a sequence of developments reveals the very 
real limits of his world. Alerted to his containment, 
he is driven to break out of this bubble, overcoming 
obstacles thrown in his path by the show’s producer, 
who suggests that the neatness 
of Truman’s artifi cially circum-
scribed world is preferable to the 
chaos beyond its limits.
Th e adventures of Dwight 
Waldo and his acolytes are not 
(yet) the stuff  of reality televi-
sion, but as public adminis-
tration scholars we now fi nd 
ourselves similarly confi ned 
by boundaries that have arisen 
around our fi eld over the last 
hundred years. To remain 
relevant in 2020, we must step 
beyond the lines that defi ne our 
fi eld but do not refl ect contem-
porary realities. Th e fi nancial 
crisis and the remarkable events of the last several 
years, coming on top of waves of reform and innova-
tion, suggest that remaining within existing disciplin-
ary borders risks marginalization of our fi eld. Only by 
forcefully resisting the academic tendency to bur-
row ever deeper within disciplinary confi nes can we 
maintain our vitality. Th e emerging world of public 
administration without borders requires a signifi cant 
reorientation.
In this brief essay, I will highlight three ascend-
ant institutional forms and practices that transcend 
boundaries that traditionally defi ne the study of pub-
lic administration. Th is list is not comprehensive, nor 
should this essay be read as an indictment of our fi eld 
for “missing” these developments. All of the topics 
have been looked at by scholars of public administra-
tion (and other disciplines), but because they are not 
easily accommodated within our existing bins, they 
have not been embraced as core issues in our fi eld.
• First, organizations that mix characteristics of 
governmental and nongovernmental entities now 
play a central role in the delivery of public goods 
and services in almost every policy arena.
• Second, market mechanisms 
in the regulation and alloca-
tion of scarce resources seem to 
be favored in numerous policy 
areas.
• Th ird, cross-border coopera-
tion and, in some cases, reliance 
on institutions that span nation-
states is an increasingly com-
mon response to transnational 
public policy challenges.
Each of these developments 
is considered before turning 
to a discussion of the changes 
required in our collective mind-
set to push these matters to the 
forefront. Essentially, I argue that 
Th e adventures of Dwight 
Waldo and his acolytes are 
not (yet) the stuff  of reality 
television, but as public 
administration scholars we now 
fi nd ourselves similarly confi ned 
by boundaries that have arisen 
around our fi eld over the last 
hundred years. To remain 
relevant in 2020, we must step 
beyond the lines that defi ne 
our fi eld but do not refl ect 
contemporary realities.
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created as part of the New Deal persisted (Koppell 2003; Stanton 
2002). Indeed, the institutional form proved useful, and govern-
ment corporations proliferated and evolved in response to changing 
conditions (Moe 1983).
Government corporations introduce a diff erent logic into the 
administrative equation by virtue of their reliance on fee-based 
revenue generation to cover costs.1 Admittedly, most government 
corporations are not formally limited by their income; their budgets 
are not literally constrained by revenues, but managers of govern-
ment corporations must shape activities with the goal of breaking 
even (Koppell 2003). And so the delegation of public policy respon-
sibilities in a variety of areas—housing, power generation, uranium 
disposal, agriculture—often operates under a diff erent dynamic 
than “normal” administration, which requires operation within an 
appropriation not linked to agency revenue. If recent history is an 
accurate guide, the linkage between programmatic revenue and bud-
get is likely to be stronger by 2020, a development that shapes the 
politics of policy in which that connection is drawn (e.g., highway 
funding, national parks) and those in which it is not.
Mutations of the basic government corporation have spread across 
the governmental landscape. Th e federal government now boasts a 
fairly extensive lineup of venture capital funds, for example. Inspired 
in part by the Small Business Administration’s Small Business 
Investment Company program, which off ers fi nancial assistance 
to privately run funds that direct capital to smaller fi rms, both the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development oversaw portfolios of government ven-
ture capital funds (Koppel 1999). Th e Central Intelligence Agency’s 
In-Q-Tel, a technology fund named after the gadget wizard from the 
James Bond fi lms, prompted the U.S. Army to start its own fund, 
OnPoint Technologies (Rottenberg 2006). Similar programs have 
proliferated at the state and local level (Lerner 2009).
Th e quirkiness, obscurity, and peculiar names associated with these 
and other organizations that break the mold of government bureau-
cracies have kept the study of quasi-government out of mainstream 
public administration studies. But the centrality in the fi nancial 
crisis of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) that originated as government corporations, 
underscores the need to pay more attention to institutions that do 
not fi t into the typical categories of bureaucratic study. For one 
thing, the eff ects of the Fannie and Freddie collapse will be far-
reaching. As Congress wrestles with the future of these two compa-
nies, other quasi-governmental entities such as the Federal Home 
Loan Bank system (which also plays a central role in the U.S. hous-
ing fi nance system and is even more obscure to students of Ameri-
can government than the GSEs) will be drawn into the discussion 
(Hoff mann and Cassell 2002).
Moreover, the activities of quasi-governmental organizations cannot 
be detached from “normal” government. Not only will the fi nancial 
implications of the GSEs’ collapse still be felt in 2020, their restruc-
turing has put the entire federal approach to housing and fi nancial 
regulation on the table as well. Most fundamentally, the Fannie 
and Freddie debacle calls into question the ability of bureaucrats to 
eff ectively administer government participation in markets. Policies 
that that harness the creditworthiness of the U.S. government are 
in order to maintain and even increase relevance in 2020, we must 
revise our understanding of both “public” and “administration” to 
better match emerging practices. Th is means rejecting the equation of 
“public” with “governmental” and instead taking in the full panoply of 
programs and institutions that create and protect public goods, regard-
less of organizational sector. It also means expanding our understand-
ing of “administration” to include market-based programs that eschew 
the state production and distribution of public goods and services that 
once defi ned government bureaucracy. Indeed, “governance in the 
public interest” might be a better moniker for our fi eld than “public 
administration.” Finally, the pressures of academic specialization that 
keep international organizations off  the radar screen of those interested 
in bureaucracy and administration must be overcome.
In his Spirit of Public Administration (1997), H. George Freder-
ickson considered the meaning of “public” and “administration” 
and expressed reservations about the expansion of these terms. He 
persuasively argued that the transmogrifi cation of public administra-
tion into “governance” would move our fi eld away from the very 
real matters of managing complex organizations and implementing 
public policy. But even in the 13 years since that book was pub-
lished, the practice of public administration has spilled over the 
boundaries of our discipline. “Public policies” are not exclusively 
implemented by government agencies wielding traditional tools. In 
shaping the meaning of public administration, we should favor the 
empirical over the theoretical.
Organizations Mixing Sectors
From its origins in the writings of ancient philosophers and our 
spiritual godfather Niccolò Machiavelli to our more proximate 
founder Woodrow Wilson, public administration has been taken 
to refer to the theory and practice of government. Th e view is fairly 
universal; scholars around the world have pursued work that hews 
to the public administration as government line. Th is approach was 
understandable in the past, but it now feels artifi cial. Th e last few 
decades have seen reliance on a wide variety of institutions to deliver 
public policy (O’Leary, Gerard, and Bingham 2006; Seidman 1988; 
Seidman and Gilmour 1986). Pushed by changes in budget rules, 
fi scal constraints, and a belief that market instruments are more 
eff ectively wielded by institutions designed to function in the mar-
ketplace, there has been a proliferation of public–private hybrids, 
partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental entities, 
and other nontraditional approaches to public management (Kettl 
2006). In the last two years, we have even witnessed an unantici-
pated American revival of a diff erent variation on quasi-government, 
government ownership of for-profi t enterprises.
None of this is new—either as a phenomenon or as a subject in 
public administration discourse. Public authorities predate the 
United States as mechanisms for the delivery of collective goods 
that endow entities outside the formal government bureaucracy 
with pseudo-governmental powers (Doig 2001; Walsh 1978). In 
the United States, public authorities—and their cousins, special 
districts and other municipal corporations—are familiar parts of 
the local governance landscape (Foster 1997; Leigland 1994). Th e 
modern era of federal experimentation began during World War I, 
during which there was a population boom of government corpora-
tions to facilitate wartime production. Although these entities were 
dissolved following the Great War, the government corporations 
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for government offi  cials, inside and around these organizations. 
Consider another class of sector-spanning institutions that has 
received attention in recent years: sovereign wealth funds. Th ese are 
vast accumulations of capital, often accrued from the sale of natural 
resources, controlled by governments. Most attention has gone to 
the funds associated with petrostates such as Russia, Kuwait, United 
Arab Emirates, and Norway, but there are others with wealth that 
is not derived from oil and gas sales (e.g., China, Singapore). And 
there are massive funds controlled by subnational governments, 
including American entities such as the Alaska Permanent Fund, 
and various state pension funds, most notably Calpers.
Each of these entities off ers a formidable public administration chal-
lenge as the leaders and staff  of these organizations—some govern-
ment employees and some retained management fi rms—seek to 
balance revenue maximization, risk management, and other policy 
considerations in portfolio management (Kimmitt 2008). Recently, 
attention has been focused on the estimates of returns off ered by pen-
sion fund managers. Slight changes in these estimates have profound 
budgetary implications for the states and municipalities that rely on 
these entities to meet their obligations to retired employees (Walsh 
2010). So the decision to rely on hybrid organizations raises myriad 
novel policy questions, but the successful implementation of such an 
approach requires an equally profound reevaluation of administra-
tive assumptions (Justice and Miller 2010). Scholars focused on the 
administrative issues raised by hybrid government can make a valu-
able contribution to policy debates by highlighting the implementa-
tion pitfalls that are often unconsidered in the policy-making process.
Th e mixing of sectors is hardly limited to government and for-profi t 
fi rms; the thickening of ties between government and nonprofi t orga-
nizations is also undermining the public administration as govern-
ment syllogism. Nonprofi ts are now vital instruments of public policy 
in a host of domains (Clerkin and Grønbjerg 2007). Th ey receive 
favorable tax treatment and direct grants, of course, and also are 
engaged as contractors for federal, state, and local agencies (Dionne 
and Chen 2001). Th is trend seems to transcend partisan dividing 
lines (White 2009). President Barack Obama kept in place the Offi  ce 
of Faith-Based Initiatives established in the White House by George 
W. Bush, a particular species of collaboration that may have been 
seen as endangered under a Democratic administration (Allard 2009).
Schools of public administration have generally embraced students 
who aspire to manage nonprofi t organizations, refl ecting the need 
to off er an attractive product to potential master’s students in an 
environment that has seen declining interest in government employ-
ment. Th e fi eld of public administration should remain synchro-
nized with this curricular demand, or scholars may fi nd themselves 
out of place in the very schools that are our home. Again, I am not 
suggesting that this is not happening. In education, health, hous-
ing, and other areas, public administration scholars have looked at 
nonprofi ts, but this remains a secondary topic in our fi eld.
Treating boundary-spanning organizations—both familiar and 
novel—as core subjects of public administration scholarship is 
important for another reason. One might argue that although these 
types of organizations are instruments or consequences of govern-
ment policy, they are at the margins of our discipline’s traditional 
focus. But the eff ects of introducing these creatures into the 
immensely appealing on paper, but the administration challenges 
cannot be overlooked when confronted with events of the last two 
years. Th e regulatory administration was clearly overwhelmed, but 
the problem runs deeper. In the midst of a mortgage credit crisis, 
members of Congress used Fannie and Freddie to stimulate or sus-
tain markets even as the condition of their balance sheets was going 
from bad to catastrophic. Senators suggested lowering the GSEs’ 
capital requirements even as the federal government put billions on 
the line to cover company losses to keep propping up house prices 
(Duhigg 2008). One cannot understand such developments—and 
the administrative challenge for government offi  cials working in this 
area—without a strong understanding of the business logic driving 
the institutions at the heart of this policy arena.
Our collective comfort with the incongruity of government spon-
sorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now seems fairly quaint. As 
publicly traded companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
the GSEs unambiguously owe a profi table return to their sharehold-
ers even as they meet regulatory demands for fi scal safety and attain-
ment of public policy goals (Koppell 2003). Th e companies are now 
eff ectively government agencies, maintaining a shareholder struc-
ture mostly as a means of keeping their liabilities off -budget. Th e 
spectacle of fi rms with no implicit government guarantee receiving 
bailouts in 2008 and 2009 actually eclipsed this development. With 
the federal government now the dominant shareholder in General 
Motors, AIG, Chrysler, and Citigroup, the problem of murkiness 
in corporate objectives is more widespread; claims that maximizing 
shareholder value is the unchallenged corporate purpose for these 
American state-owned enterprises are undermined by the thorny 
reality of government offi  cials seeking to impose policy objectives 
(e.g., saving dealerships from elimination) (King 2009). Similarly, 
fi nancial institutions that accepted Troubled Asset Relief Program 
funds are assailed for their practices—from nonlending to executive 
compensation—with the linkage between dissatisfaction and their 
receipt of government largesse quite explicit.
Public administration scholars must confront such developments 
head on, and they must not be deterred by the “business-y” aspects of 
quasi-government. Corporations in which the public has a material 
interest must be an integral part of our disciplinary territory. Leaving 
such institutions to be studied by scholars from other fi elds is more 
than an interdisciplinary turf concession, it is an ideological choice 
with policy consequences. To leave analysis of the corporations owned 
wholly or in part by the federal government, or those receiving bil-
lions in taxpayer funded bailouts, to economists, fi nance professors, 
and scholars from fi elds other than public administration is to deny 
the “publicness” of this phenomenon. By examining these newly cre-
ated creatures as subjects of public administration inquiry, however, 
we can (and should) make clear that steps taken with respect to these 
entities must be examined in more than mere economic or fi nancial 
terms. Indeed, extending the umbrella of public administration to 
cover such entities—and explicating the administrative complexi-
ties of such arrangements—may reduce the likelihood of Uncle Sam 
holding equity in these fi rms 10 years from now.
Th ere are both policy and administration dimensions to these devel-
opments. Th e former receives more attention, but the latter is of 
primary interest here. Government-sponsored enterprises and other 
mixed institutions introduce distinctive imperatives and constraints 
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the future of our fi eld. First, we have more 
and more institutions that do not look like 
traditional government agencies. We should 
resist our collective tendency to treat these 
novel arrangements as sui generis deviations 
from a norm. Th e public–private hybrid is the 
contemporary norm, and thus the eff ective 
administration of such entities should be a 
central concern and one that informs, and is 
informed by, mainstream public administra-
tion discourse. Second, increased reliance 
on organizations that blur the lines between 
public and private alters the burden on tradi-
tional government bureaucracies. Many of the 
core processes in which public administration 
is interested—from personnel to procurement 
to budgeting—are upset by the introduction 
of these new bureaucratic beasts. And new 
responsibilities, discussed more in the next 
section, increase the emphasis on skills (predicting markets, assess-
ing risks) that have never been bureaucratic strengths.
Using Markets to Deliver Public Goods
Treating “market” as the opposite of “government” is just as limiting as 
regarding “public” as government’s synonym. Although governments 
obviously regulate markets and even participate in them as buyers and 
sellers, historically public administration has treated government as 
something outside the marketplace. In the canon of public adminis-
tration, attention typically is focused on government programs and 
institutions that produce and distribute goods and services through a 
vertically organized bureaucracy. Similarly, regulatory responsibilities 
are carried out with a “command and control” approach as govern-
ment bureaucrats write rules and impose them on private actors. Th is 
image is not accurate today—as the examples in the previous section 
indicate—and it certainly will not be 10 years from now.
Some government participation in markets has received careful 
attention from public administration scholars. Procurement, for 
example, is a core subject, and it includes, by extension, some of the 
most current topics, including the contracting out of government 
services (e.g., Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Frederickson 
and Frederickson 2006). Other subjects inevitably touch on the gov-
ernment as a market participant. As an employer, for example, the 
government is a major participant in labor markets, not just a regula-
tor (e.g., Fernandez, Smith, and Wenger 2007). But the fi eld has not 
followed as enthusiastically as public administration has entered the 
market in at least three ways: fi rst, the increased reliance on market-
oriented tools of government, like extension of insurance and guar-
antees; second, the transformation of regulation from a tool to curb 
negative behavior into a substitute for traditional government service 
provision; and third, the emphasis on market-based approaches to 
regulation in particular substantive fi elds (e.g., climate change). Each 
should be seen as fertile public administration research topics.
In 2020, public policy strategies incorporating market mechanisms 
that are less familiar to students of bureaucracy are likely to be 
most popular. Th e use of loan guarantees and government insur-
ance, for example, represents an intelligent leveraging of the U.S. 
 government’s creditworthiness that does not strain the budget. 
 environment are felt in every traditional area of 
administration research, placing new demands 
on government bureaucracies and processes.
Th e regulators and bureaucrats overseeing 
hybrids and fi rms with government owner-
ship stakes, for example, are on terrain as 
unexplored by public administration scholars 
as those they are supervising. Hybrid organi-
zations are linked less formally to the federal 
bureaucracy than traditional agencies; they are 
often not in the budget, they are not staff ed 
by appointees, and they are exempt from 
management laws (Koppell 2001). Regulatory 
relationships are de facto substitutes for these 
severed administrative ties (Koppell 2003). 
Goals must be translated into specifi c require-
ments that can be applied without under-
mining the hybrid. If the regulation is too 
onerous, the theoretical benefi ts promised by the quasi-governmen-
tal structures may be lost. On the other hand, failure to adequately 
regulate hybrid organizations can leave the public policy objectives 
unreached thus undermining the underlying purpose. Th e regulator 
has to balance confl icting goals—fi nancing housing for Americans 
without threatening the fi scal health of the U.S. government, in this 
case—with no obvious solution. Adapting regulation to this task has 
proven a challenge, with the current Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
situation a dramatic illustration. Even with the companies facing fi s-
cal disaster, Congress smacked the regulator (which it had chastised 
for its weak oversight of the two fi rms) when it attempted to set 
limits on size of the portfolio size, and increased the size of the loans 
Fannie and Freddie could purchase (Shenn and Tyson 2008).
For students of public administration, such oversight follies beg the 
question of bureaucratic ability to eff ectively regulate the proliferat-
ing public–private hybrid organizations. Similarly, the now com-
mon collaboration between government agencies and nonprofi ts 
should raise concern regarding bureaucratic capacity to manage such 
programs (Selden, Sowa, and Sandfort 2006). Th e emergence of a 
set of special companies—those fi nancial institutions that, through 
scale or interconnectedness, are deemed “too big to fail”—raises the 
stakes considerably. With investors and business partners confi dent 
that the government will step in to make them whole no matter 
what goes wrong, the emerging burden on fi nancial regulators will 
dwarf those placed on GSE regulators. Government offi  cials have 
been given unprecedented responsibilities, including setting com-
pensation levels for executives of publicly traded fi nancial institu-
tions. If proposals now before Congress are adopted, government 
bureaucrats will be put in a position to evaluate massive fi nancial 
institutions and empowered to preemptively deconstruct them when 
they pose a dire threat to the economy (Puzzanghera 2009). It is 
worth noting here that in-depth analysis of the agencies that will be 
on the spot—the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Offi  ce 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and even the Federal Reserve—is surprisingly scarce in 
the archival pages of this journal.
Th e proliferation of entities that span the public and private sec-
tors thus has fi rst- and second-order eff ects that ought to infl uence 
Th e proliferation of entities that 
span public and private 
sectors . . . has fi rst- and 
second-order eff ects that ought 
to infl uence the future of our 
fi eld. First, we have more and 
more institutions that do not 
look like traditional government 
agencies. . . . Second, increased 
reliance on organizations that 
blur the lines between public 
and private alters the burden 
on traditional government 
bureaucracies.
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such a way that behavior is modifi ed without creating unintended 
consequences. Current experience with incentives created for 
ethanol production is a cautionary tale. Farmers switching to fuel 
corn production from the growth of crops for human and feedstock 
consumption is causing a rise in food prices (Ayre 2007). Did the 
bureaucracy have the knowledge necessary to predict this outcome 
and the ability to resist legislative will? Th is is a vital question for 
our fi eld. Indeed, the historic health care legislation passed in March 
2010 will require government bureaucrats to create insurance 
exchanges whose smooth-functioning will be key to the success of 
the new system.
As if these adaptations were not putting enough pressure on regula-
tory agencies, the place of traditional regulation in the arsenal of the 
government is under attack. Market-based mechanisms are off ered 
as a more preferable—and more politically feasible—approach to 
vexing problems than conventional command and control arrange-
ments. Th e cutting edge of this trend is emissions regulation.
Th e eff ort to cap greenhouse gas emissions is now centered on 
determining the appropriate approach. Th e command and con-
trol approach, after years of being pilloried, is being pushed aside 
by market-based approaches and enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol 
(Stavins 2003; Stavins, Keohane, and Revesz 1998; Woerdman 
2004). So the answer is not to create requirements for more effi  cient 
smokestack scrubbers or lower-sulfur coal. Even a more traditional 
market approach, a carbon tax, is widely scorned. Th e popular 
solution, and the one adopted by the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, is a cap and trade system. Trading in emissions permits places 
the reduction decisions in the hands of fi rms, allowing them to 
determine the most effi  cient way to satisfy societal targets (Antes, 
Hansjürgens, and Letmathe 2008). Th is logic has been extended 
to land use, where grazing permits and mineral extraction rights 
have been auctioned (so far on a pilot basis). Th is approach uses the 
market to determine the “value” of the privilege to consume a public 
good and even shifts political activism to the marketplace by giving 
environmentalists an opportunity to purchase land-use privileges or 
pollution permits.
Th ese programs represent another type of regulatory governance. 
Th e state retains some responsibility for establishing the rules of the 
market. And the commodity being traded in many cases—permits, 
credits, licenses—derives value by virtue of government programs 
(Durant et al. 2004). But unlike programs that keep decisions 
regarding allocation and preferred method in the hands of regula-
tors, market programs shift as much discretion as possible to the 
market participants. Again, public administration must embrace 
such developments and see the decision-making processes of these 
regulated fi rms as part of our fi eld rather than cede this terrain to 
other disciplines. Doing so will leave critical elements—issues of 
equity, process, and governance—out of the equation.
Transnational Governance
In almost every policy arena, the most severe public policy problems 
are not confi ned by political boundaries. Each day brings new stories 
indicating the need for a deeper appreciation of the interaction 
between phenomena experienced on opposite sides of the globe in 
the realm of security, environmental protection, and public health. As 
noted earlier, changes in fuel regulation on one continent are blamed 
Given the debt being accumulated at present, it seems safe to 
assume that this will be a signifi cant virtue for the foreseeable future. 
In a wide range of policy areas, including agriculture, housing, 
trade, small business, energy, and international development, such 
approaches are already well integrated into federal policy (Salamon 
2002). Th ey eff ect change not by direct expenditure, but by altering 
the incentives of private market participants.
Th is approach to public administration poses many distinctive ques-
tions that should be embraced. It reduces outlays but increases risk 
rather than debt, for instance. But the federal government has not 
demonstrated its competency as a risk manager, and, with trillions 
of dollars in outstanding liability, we are already sitting on an explo-
sive fi nancial powder keg. Th e chain reaction stemming from the 
collapse of the subprime mortgage market gave vivid evidence of the 
consequences of leverage gone awry. Yet the policy response—wise 
or unwise—extended the government’s guarantee to some of the 
most troubled institutions and thus dramatically increased exposure 
of the public treasury. Congress has not seriously addressed the risk 
management problem, and it will be hard-pressed to do so in the 
future, for any comprehensive management of federal risk would 
likely establish limits on the extension of federal guarantees. Public 
administration scholars can push this issue to the forefront by mak-
ing risk management a core topic in our fi eld (Hood, Rothstein, and 
Baldwin 2001; Pollak 1996).
Instead of turning to mixed institutions, collaborative partner-
ships, or contractual relationships, governments often use creative 
regulatory strategies to pursue public policy objectives in ways that 
stretch our conception of regulation. Th e mandate of regulatory 
bodies has been expanded to include the shaping of incentives for 
private market participants to induce creation of public goods. Th is 
moves away from a narrower idea of regulation as mechanism to 
limit negative externalities. Shifting the burden of producing public 
goods from government to private actors, this regulation might be 
seen as inducing the creation of positive externalities.
One example that has received attention in recent years is the use 
of the Community Reinvestment Act to steer capital into poorer 
communities. Th e law sets requirements for fi nancial institutions 
to serve “whole communities” and represents a response to the 
problem of “redlining,” or the systematic avoidance of communities 
by fi nancial institutions (Barr 2005). By setting a regulatory require-
ment, this law eff ectively steers capital into areas where it is chroni-
cally undersupplied. Critics have charged that the implementation 
of the Community Reinvestment Act, with insuffi  cient attention 
to the reliance on unscrupulous loan originators, added fuel to the 
subprime crisis (Pressman 2008).
Th is is precisely the type of challenge introduced by the movement 
from one type of governance to another, and a reason why it should 
be treated as a marked shift in public administration. Majone 
(1997) calls it the substitution of regulatory governance for positive 
governance. For regulatory bureaucracies, this represents a reorder-
ing of the goals and measures of success. In such circumstances, 
regulatory bureaucracies depend on the regulated entities to thrive 
in order to achieve policy objectives. Regulators must understand 
the considerations driving the business calculations of fi rms in 
targeted areas. Any rules must be calibrated to alter these calculi in 
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demands. Indeed, each organization—even those that are part of the 
United Nations “system” of organizations—is truly distinctive.
In recent decades, the landscape of international organizations 
has become more diverse as nongovernmental bodies and quasi-
governmental bodies play an increasingly prominent role in global 
governance. Standard-setting bodies such as the International Orga-
nization for Standardization or the International Electrotechincal 
Commission originated as obscure industrial coordination bodies, 
intended to ensure the interoperability of devices and mechani-
cal parts. But the substantive footprint of these entities has grown 
over the years to include management processes and even corporate 
social responsibility. More specialized bodies such as the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board, a nonprofi t organization based 
in London, promulgate standards that are just as crucial in global 
fi nancial regulation as those produced by the intergovernmental 
Basel Committee on Capital Standards. From an administrative 
perspective, these standard-setting bodies represent a signifi cant 
departure from standard models of governmental rulemaking. In 
general, the work of these entities is carried out by members—with 
the staff  playing mostly a supporting role—who participate through 
technical committees and working groups centered around substan-
tive areas of concern. Naturally, this creates a dynamic entirely dif-
ferent from that associated with a typical Administrative Procedure 
Act rulemaking exercise.
Even more intriguing, there has been a proliferation of nongovern-
mental standard-setting bodies with a clear social agenda driving 
their work. Th e Forest Stewardship Council and the Marine Stew-
ardship Council are perhaps the best known to American consum-
ers. Th ese organizations attempt to get market power behind their 
standards, and, when successful, these can be every bit as compelling 
as the rules set forth by intergovernmental organizations. Indeed, 
one key fi nding of my recently completed study of international 
rulemaking organizations was that the adherence dynamics—includ-
ing rule adoption and enforcement—were not terribly diff erent for 
government and nongovernment rule-makers (Koppell 2010).
If the mere existence of global rulemaking 
bodies is not enough to attract the attention 
of public administration scholars, the increas-
ing centrality of transnational rules in a wide 
variety of policy arenas—from food safety to 
money laundering to Internet commerce—
ought to be. Th e emergence of a world 
government is not at hand, but the increasing 
importance of global rulemaking bodies sug-
gests a future of meaningful public adminis-
tration that transcends borders. And like the 
rise of quasi-governmental bodies domesti-
cally, the emergence of global governance has 
secondary eff ects at home.
Th e intertwining of American bureaucracy 
with global governance organizations is a far 
less advanced phenomenon than the proliferation of public–private 
hybrids or the incorporation of market mechanisms, but it is already 
an important fact of life in many policy areas (O’Toole and Hanf 
2002). Bodies such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, 
for the infl ation of food prices and even  stability-shattering riots on 
the other side of the globe. Calamity in one fi nancial market spreads 
almost instantaneously to others. Deadly diseases take advantage of 
modern transportation to cross oceans in a matter of hours. Criminals 
prey on victims from remote corners of the Earth using wild schemes 
or devious software. Th e demand for raw materials in China’s bur-
geoning economy drives commodity prices higher and renders cost 
estimates for municipal construction projects hopelessly low.
Th ere is, of course, a substantial collection of international organiza-
tions devoted to addressing these problems. People are most familiar 
with the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., 
the International Monetary Fund, World Bank) but there are many 
others, some affi  liated with the United Nations and others not. 
Th ere are a host of regional organizations that work with or comple-
ment global eff orts. And, it is important to remember, there are 
many nongovernmental bodies that play a vital role in addressing 
transnational challenges. Th e development of such organizations 
and their assumption of meaningful roles are accelerating. Th e 
recent meetings of the G-20, for example, included a commitment 
to better coordinate fi nancial regulation as a response to the lessons 
learned from the fi nancial crisis (Financial Stability Board 2009).
Public administration as a fi eld has been slower than the bureaucra-
cies we study to appreciate and devote attention to this new reality. 
Th e pages of our journals feature limited discussion of the distinctive 
administrative issues associated with transnational bureaucracies. Th is 
is probably attributable to the way in which disciplinary lines are 
drawn in political science and public administration. For the most 
part, international organizations are the purview of the “international 
relations” subfi eld of political science. Many of the seminal scholars 
looking at international organizations were interested in organiza-
tional design and administration; their work would be comfortable 
alongside public administration research (Haas 1964; Jacobson 1979). 
Alas, most contemporary research in this area is not as concerned with 
administrative issues, and, for the most part, our fi eld remains focused 
on institutions within a single jurisdiction—or perhaps comparisons 
across a small number of such entities.
Transnational governance has been with us for 
longer than many may realize. Th e Universal 
Postal Union and the International Telecom-
munications Union (née Telegraph) were 
created in the 1860s to facilitate smoother 
cross-border communication (Murphy 1994). 
In the years since, many other international 
organizations have been created to deal with 
issues requiring global coordination and 
harmonization. Traditionally, these have been 
intergovernmental organizations with a basis 
in treaties among states. Th e World Intel-
lectual Property Organization, for example, 
has its origins in several nineteenth-century 
treaties signed to protect copyrights and trade-
marks across borders. Th e International Civil 
Aviation Organization arose to establish safety and communications 
standards when transoceanic fl ight became a part of everyday life. 
Each of these organizations developed a bureaucracy, administrative 
procedures, and a rulemaking process suitable to a unique set of 
If the mere existence of 
various global rulemaking 
bodies is not enough to 
attract the attention of public 
administration scholars, 
the increasing centrality of 
transnational rules in a wide 
variety of policy arenas—
from food safety to money-
laundering to Internet 
commerce—ought to be.
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equation of “public” with “government” and seeing administration 
in the broadest possible light to capture all of the varied approaches 
to governance (Frederickson 1997). Divorcing the idea of “public-
ness” from government can maintain the fi eld’s vitality without 
rendering it hopelessly amorphous, as some have feared. In the most 
straightforward formulation, to be a public organization is to be of 
the government. Bozeman and Bretschneider (1994) refi ned this 
notion to recognize the reality that many organizations that are not 
literally governmental (such as government contractors or some 
nonprofi ts) are funded by governments or derive their authority 
from governments, making them public as well. Others have looked 
at the tools employed by an organization, the mechanisms used to 
control the organization, or the expectations facing an organiza-
tion as the relevant criteria to determine publicness (Antonsen and 
Jorgensen 1997; Bozeman 1987, 2007; Pesch 2008). Th ese concep-
tualizations of “public” would take in many of the developments 
described in this essay. Still, these approaches do not disentangle 
publicness from sector because the aspects of organizational design 
that connote publicness ultimately trace back to government (Lan 
and Rainey 1992; Perry and Rainey 1988).
To frame publicness as something distinct from governmentalness, 
the quality of an organization’s function, its role in society, and the 
impact of its activities must be captured (Bozeman and Bretsch-
neider 1994, 219; Haque 2001). Ten years from now, we should 
see “publicness” as a measure of the extent to which an organization 
draws on, invokes, or aff ects the common interests of all members 
of a society (Haque 2001; Nutt and Backoff  1993; Pesch 2008; 
Wamsley and Zald 1976). We might capture publicness by look-
ing for the pursuit of collective goods and an eff ect on individuals’ 
public or civic interests.
• Collective goods: Organizations serving a common interest 
should be regarded as more public (Haque 2001). Nondivisible 
public goods are, in this sense, more public than individually 
consumed goods. Th us, to illustrate with a rather extreme com-
parison, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees 
is more public than the Coca-Cola Company, even though the 
beverage maker serves a larger percentage of the world’s popula-
tion. Organizations that pursue profi ts for shareholders are less 
public than those endeavoring to maintain collective goods such 
as security. Similarly, control of a common good—by a private 
or governmental organization—renders an organization more 
public.
• Civic interests: Publicness is about more than collectivity. 
Some individual considerations are highly public. State coercion 
is public not only because it refl ects government’s monopoly on 
violence, but also because it deprives individuals of their rights of 
citizenship. An organization is directly impinging on the “pub-
lic” side of the individual (Benn and Gaus 1983). Organizations 
can be diff erentiated on this basis. Th ose that aff ect individuals’ 
purely private interests—say, their product choices—are less 
public than those that aff ect civic interests such as voting ability 
or the right to purchase property.
Few have trouble seeing the work of governmental bodies as public 
in character given these criteria. And government contractors 
would still be seen as part of the public administration fi rmament 
with publicness framed in this light. For example, private prison 
the World Intellectual Property Organization, and, most famously, 
the World Trade Organization make rules with serious ramifi cations 
for American actors. In many cases, these rules can confl ict with 
American statutes and regulations, requiring adaptation on the part 
of government agencies and fi rms. And contrary to the view that the 
U.S. government is unbending in the face of international norms, 
this accommodation of international rules occurs regularly (Chayes 
and Chayes 1991).
More importantly, the American government is taking its partici-
pation in such international organizations more seriously than 
has been the case historically (DaVaux 2000). For decades, the 
International Organization for Standardization, which promul-
gates standards in a host of industrial areas, has been dominated 
by Europeans, giving businesses from these countries a signifi cant 
potential advantage. If global standards match European standards 
(and not American), the size of the potential market accessible 
to European fi rms without costly adaptation to local markets is 
signifi cant (DaVaux 2000). So participation in the deliberations of 
international bodies is a commonplace responsibility for American 
bureaucrats.
Agencies now routinely devote staff  to international issues and 
participate in global and regional transnational organizations. Th e 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, has an international 
offi  ce. More importantly, the regulations produced by the commis-
sion make frequent reference to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) regulations and the requirement that American 
entities comply with IAEA standards and make themselves open 
to IAEA inspections (NRC 2004). Th is type of recognition of the 
primacy of international regulations is far from universal, but the 
practices of many government bureaucracies refl ect international 
mandates from entities such as the World Customs Union, the Uni-
versal Postal Union, and the Convention on the Trade in Interna-
tional and Endangered Species.
Th e need for an integrated global fi nancial regulatory architecture 
was highlighted by the crisis, but active support for transnational 
rulemaking institutions in this policy area has been growing for 
some time. Th e Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, 
for example, has gained prominence as shutting off  the fi nan-
cial spigot has become a tool to stop terrorists (Ayres 2002). Th e 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the nongovernmental 
Financial Accounting Standards Board consult with the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board as it develops the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). It was announced recently 
that companies listing in the United States need only prepare IFRS 
accounting, thus saving them the expense of reporting their fi nan-
cial data according to GAAP standards (SEC 2007).
By 2020, our fi eld should have embraced the international arena, 
bringing attention from those serious about organization and 
administration. At a minimum, educated public administrators must 
be aware of and well versed in the dynamics of global governance.
More than any single addition to the research agenda, the most pro-
found adaptation required is that we embrace a broader understand-
ing of “public administration” to include all forms of governance 
intended to serve public interests. Th is means moving beyond the 
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forms of public nonjurisdictional or nongovernmental policymaking 
and implementation” (2005, 294). Indeed, this covers a substan-
tial portion of the developments described in these pages. Much 
research that comes under the governance heading, Frederickson 
notes, complements the bread and butter of public administration, 
the “day-to-day management of an agency or organization,” and 
public administration could even be expanded to include “public 
administration of governance,” the management of nongovernmen-
tal institutions and organizations” (Frederickson 2005, 300). Th is 
starts to sound a lot like the expanded view of “public” proposed 
above. From a disciplinary marketing perspective, an imperialistic 
version of governance that includes both the day-to-day challenges 
of administration and the transformation of states and governments 
may be most attractive. Th is is perhaps broader than that which 
Frederickson contemplates. In short, governance would include the 
whole of public administration as we know it and then some!
One can easily get caught up debating labels 
ad infi nitum. Whether we use “public admin-
istration” or “governance” is less important 
than the boundaries we defi ne for our fi eld 
and the relationship of those boundaries to 
the world in which we are interested. In its 
early days, public administration was the 
heart of political science. Indeed, the two were 
essentially indistinguishable. In the years since, 
however, our fi eld has become increasingly dis-
connected from many of the big-picture ques-
tions and seen as being narrowly concerned 
with bureaucratic processes and the implementation of government 
programs. Indeed, we ought to take umbrage at the fact that many of 
the giants of our fi eld who pushed beyond this defi nition—Herbert 
Simon, Chester Barnard, Mary Parker Follet, and Charles Lindblom, 
to name few—are now labeled something other than scholars of 
public administration because they do not meet this overly restrictive 
expectation. Th is development may be an unintended consequence 
of the rise of schools of public policy and public administration, 
which sapped public administration scholarship out of departments 
of political science. Or it may lie much more deeply in an overly 
eager acceptance of Wilson’s politics–administration dichotomy. Th e 
historical explanation, however, is a topic for a diff erent essay.
Th e point here is to argue for a reassertion of a more expansive con-
ceptualization of public administration—one that is empirically and 
historically grounded—that accommodates the varied forms and 
approaches to the implementation of public policy. Th e enthusiasm 
with which many scholars have embraced the governance label 
speaks to our collective desire to break beyond the boundaries that 
have hardened around our fi eld. Th e contemporary developments 
sketched in this essay are off ered to force a confrontation with the 
artifi cial limitations that have been placed on public administra-
tion. Like Truman Burbank struggling to get beyond the soundstage 
wall, we should pursue a broader conception of our fi eld (whether 
it is called governance or something else) and eagerly revel in all the 
messiness lying beyond the borders.
Note
1. Many so-called government corporations are, in many respects, indistinguishable 
from agencies. Th ey are on budget, receive appropriated dollars, and are staff ed 
 operators, companies that have assumed increasing responsibility for 
housing the nation’s inmates, are carrying out a collective function 
and aff ect the civic interests of inmates (e.g., Morris 1998). Simi-
larly, Halliburton drew questions—and charges of malfeasance—
precisely because it was carrying out the administration of public 
functions in Iraq (e.g., Gibbons 2004).
But there are nongovernmental organizations that might not be seen 
as falling within the purview of public administration that would 
seem more public when considered in the proposed approach. Th e 
Educational Testing Service, for example, is a New Jersey–based 
nonprofi t organization that creates and administers a range of 
academic tests that are crucial to thousands of students seeking 
admission to American universities every year. Th e exams are off ered 
around the world and constitute a gateway to U.S. higher educa-
tion. Th us, the role performed by this private entity is public in its 
eff ect and broad in scope. Unsurprisingly, this 
organization has been criticized by teachers, 
students, parents, and concerned interest 
groups (Jackson 1986; Nordheimer and Franz 
1997). It makes sense for public administra-
tion scholars in the education area to view the 
Educational Testing Service as a legitimate 
subject of inquiry. Th ere are other examples in 
diff erent policy arenas—such as credit rating 
agencies that are crucial element of fi nancial 
architecture or the standard-setting bodies dis-
cussed earlier—that might be more persuasive 
to some (Sinclair 2005).
Th is is not off ered as a defi nitive approach, but rather to suggest a 
sense in which publicness can be separated from governmentalness 
to redefi ne our disciplinary terrain. Others would undoubtedly 
improve on this primitive eff ort. A conceptualization of publicness 
that moves beyond government is consistent with an understand-
ing of “public administration” that captures varied approaches 
to governance. Defi nitions of governance generally touch on the 
processes, systems, and structures (formal and informal) by which 
behavior is regulated and constrained (Peters 1995). Our fi eld 
should be concerned with organizations that are charged with creat-
ing order in public spheres. As such, governance does not require 
government involvement, although it certainly is very common, 
and any organization engaged in governance would be, by defi ni-
tion, “public” (Peters and Pierre 1998; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; 
Ruggie 2004).
Broadening the view of “public” in such a way that it encompasses 
varied approaches to governance may seem like a backdoor means 
of access to the governance trend. Frederickson (2005) off ered an 
insightful critique of the faddish rise of “governance” in place of 
public administration. While expressing some frustration with the 
knee-jerk normative desirability of “governance,” which seemed to 
amorphously encompass anything that was supposedly novel and 
good (e.g., New Public Management), he emphasized the value 
of what “governance” does add to the agenda of public adminis-
tration scholars. Governance takes in, according to Frederickson 
“(1)  vertical and horizontal interjurisdictional and interorganiza-
tional cooperation; (2) extension of the state or jurisdiction by con-
tracts or grants to third parties, including subgovernments; and (3) 
One can easily get caught up 
debating labels ad infi nitum. 
Whether we use “public 
administration” or “governance” 
is less important than the 
boundaries we defi ne for our 
fi eld and the relationship of 
those boundaries to the world 
in which we are interested.
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